Little has been explored on how the subdivision of status for gender has an influence in actors' behavioral decision-making. The present study addresses the need to subdivide status for female directors and male CEOs in order to better investigate the former's decision-making toward the latter. By drawing on social identity and social comparison theory, female directors try to formulate a balance with male CEOs. Female directors enjoy high economic status, whereas they occupy low social status compared to male CEOs. In contrast, male CEOs enjoy high economic and social status. Thus, statusinconsistent female directors aim to balance their overall status with male CEOs through targeting the latter's economic status. By utilizing S&P 1500 firms from 2007 to 2016, as females in the boardroom increases, male CEO's salary growth rate decreased. This influence was strengthened as female directors hold more board appointments at other firms, and it was only salient in male-dominated industries where gender inequality is high, and none of the effect was significant toward female CEOs. The findings suggest that enhancing gender equality in an organization will promote legitimacy in decisionmaking by preventing one's subjectivity from intervening.
INTRODUCTION
For the past decades, executive compensation has attracted substantial attention from scholars in Strategic Management, Finance, Accounting, Economics, along with the attention of managers, regulators and the general public (O'Reilly III, Main, and Crystal, 1988; Bebchuck and Fried, 2003; O'Reilly III and Main, 2010) . A dominant theoretical perspective of the studies in executive compensation has been the principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Murphy, 1999; O'Reilly III et al., 2010) . In this line of study, optimal compensation contracts are claimed to be designed by aligning the interests of the executives with those of the shareholders through linking executive pay with performance (Murphy, 1999; O'Reilly III et al., 2010 ).
Yet, in spite of the numerous studies, the pessimism regarding the principal-agent theory on explaining the executive compensation existed (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson, 1998; Murphy, 1999; Deutsch, 2005; O'Reilly et al., 2010) . In light of this lack of support for the agency perspective, scholars have newly focused on the social psychological perspectives when explicating the executive compensation by drawing on social comparison theory. The executive pay was proposed to be settled through the behavior of comparison between board of directors and CEO's social capital, power, and status. (O'Reilly et al., 1988; Belliveau, O'Reilly, and Wade, 1996; Bebchuck et al., 2003; O'Reilly et al., 2010; Chizema, Liu, Lu, and Gao, 2015; Ridge, Aime, and White, 2015) .
Although previous views have provided convincing explanations for the process of setting executive compensation, what is lacking is a consideration of the specific behavioral mechanism of the participant's action. In this study, we consider what specific behavior arises when board of directors set executive pay during the process of social comparison by segregating an individual's status into two: social and economic status.
How the identification of the board of directors in terms of socioeconomic status influence social comparison processes toward the executive will be investigated.
Especially, the identification of the board of directors and the executive will be examined through taking gender into consideration. Recent acknowledgment regarding the benefits of gender diversity (Westphal and Milton, 2000; Hillman, Shropshire and Cannella, 2007; Lyngsie and Foss, 2017) paved the way for women to make considerable inroads to the fields that have been traditionally dominated by men in the corporate world (Dezso and Ross, 2012) . Females currently occupy 19.9% in the boardroom, yet, still hold only 5.8% of the CEO positions at the S&P 500 (Catalyst, 2017) . As such, females still remain significantly underrepresented at the corporate leadership position (Lee and James, 2007; Dezso et al., 2012; McDonald and Westphal, 2013 ; Dezso, Ross and Uribe, 2016 Leslie, Manchester and Dahm, 2017) . Thus, we propose that the identification of female directors based on their underrepresentation in the workforce compared to male CEOs should be kept into consideration when investigating over the decision-making toward executive compensation.
My theoretical framework draws on research in social psychology to offer an exhaustive understanding of the specific behaviors held by female board of directors in the process of setting male executive's compensation level. I first delved into the socioeconomic status held by female directors and male CEOs. The general phenomenon of females being underrepresented influences the way female directors identify their relatively low social status compared to males. However, the economic status of the female directors and male CEOs is situated at the same high hierarchy. Thus, the inferior social status perceived by female directors compared to male CEOs (Eagly and Karau, 2002) allows comparison behaviors to be activated toward male CEOs. In order to balance the overall status between female directors and male CEOs, females aim to demote male CEOs' economic status. This balance formation behavior is also suggested to be strengthened as those female directors gain more power, which can be observed as the female directors' other board appointments increase. This study contributes to the literature on executive compensation and gender, and theoretical perspective on the social comparison by proposing that enhancing gender equality in the workforce will make the process of setting executive compensation more legitimate by reducing female directors' balance formation behavior toward male executives.
The study will proceed as follows. Drawing on the role congruity theory in terms of gender, social identity theory is utilized in order to show how gender inequality has influenced the identity of female directors and male CEOs. Next, I suggest the balance formation behavior from social comparison theory be enacted by female directors toward male CEOs, which leads to targeting male CEOs' economic status. In addition, the validity of the study will be strengthened by investigating female directors' behaviors in male and female-dominated industries, which differs in the degree of gender equality, and examining whether the targeting behavior held by female directors is also enacted toward female CEOs as well.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Social identity and role congruity
Social identity theory provides a basis for understanding why the identification of male CEOs and female directors is likely to influence male CEO's compensation.
According to this theoretical perspective, individuals normally utilize visible demographic attributes, such as gender, to classify themselves and others (Abraham, 2017) . As an individual believes that he or she belongs to a certain social category, one assimilates oneself to the demographically similar others (Stets and Burke, 2000; Abraham, 2017) . Among the demographic attributes, individuals in the workforce tend to put themselves into a gender-based in-versus out-group categorization since gender is a salient and visible characteristic in the workplace (Ridgeway, 1991; McDonald et al., 2013; Abraham, 2017) . In addition, this distinction made in the gender-based category becomes more pronounced as one occupies power and control (Stets et al., 2000; Goodwin, Operario, and Fiske, 1998; Abraham, 2017) . However, the attachment toward the in-group becomes strengthened when the categorization is based on the stereotype formulated by the society (Stets et al., 2000) .
Gender has been a category that is portrayed to possess stereotype (Eagly et al., 2002) , which fosters each gender to lean more towards their in-group (Stets et al., 2000) . This leads to a salient difference between each gender's identity. For example, the identification of female group allows different psychological processes and behaviors to be activated compared to the group of males (Abdullah, Ismail, and Nachum, 2016) . To be specific, females tend to conduct enhanced monitoring activities than males through possessing higher degree of conscientious in executing their roles in the director position and may behave more as an "outsider" of the boardroom, being independent of management (Adams and Ferriera, 2009; McDonald et al., 2013; Triana, Miller, and Trzebiatowski, 2013) .
Not only their identification by themselves differs, each gender is also expected from the society to follow their distinctive gender-specific role, and when it comes to discussing the roles of a leader, it leans toward a specific gender, which is male. Role congruity theory provides a basis for how the gender roles and leader roles produce two types of prejudice (Eagly et al., 2002) . According to Eagly et al. (2002) the role congruity theory claims the congruity between gender roles and other roles, especially leadership roles. Under this theoretical perspective, its consequence generates prejudice. Males are commonly claimed to possess agentic attributes, such as being assertive, ambitious, dominant, independent, and possessing leader-like characteristics. Contrary to these attributes, communal characteristics, such as being affectionate, interpersonally sensitive, sympathetic, and gentle, are normally ascribed to females. Since the females are generally perceived to possess communal qualities which are far from being the traditional leader, female leaders, who possess not only communal qualities but also agentic attributes, are perceived with incongruity in their roles. The female leaders' possession of the agentic attributes let the society perceive that those females are violating the society's gender norm, which is a social expectation about how males or females ought to behave in a given social context (Stets et al., 2000; Lee et al., 2007) . This view fosters less favorable attitude towards the female leaders, making them confront the "glass-ceiling" (Kesner, 1988; Eagly et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2007; O'Reilly et al., 2010) .
Thus, drawing on the role congruity theory, while males and females are acknowledged with distinctive identity based on different norms, attitudes, beliefs, and perspectives (Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin, 1999) , female leaders' identity becomes equivocal since they are perceived with incongruity in their roles.
Status-consistency vs. Status-inconsistency
Previous studies elaborated on the distinction between females as the minority and males being the majority at top management to shed light on the decision-making processes for a firm's strategic behaviors (Hillman et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2007; Adams et al., 2009; Dezso et al., 2012; McDonald et al., 2013; Chen, Crossland, and Huang, 2014; Hill, Upadhyay, and Beekun, 2015; Abdullah et al., 2016; Abraham, 2017) . Nonetheless, little has been explored regarding the influence of acknowledging their segregated status.
According to Weber, stratification in the society has been delineated based upon the categorization of an individual regarding three separate criteria: class, power, and status.
In addition, Lenski (1954) further elaborated it in four different hierarchies: income, occupation, education, and ethnic hierarchy. If every criterion formulates a congruence, an individual is claimed to possess "status-consistency". However, when each criterion does not rank in the same hierarchy, one experiences "status-inconsistency". As an example of the latter, she or he could occupy a high status in one's occupation, receiving reverence from the society, but possess a low status in terms of economic earnings.
I aim to segregate the status of female directors and male CEOs into two categories: social status and economic status. Social status is defined as the amount of prominence, respect, and influence each enjoys in the eyes of the others (Anderson, John, Keltner, and Kring, 2001) . However, in this study's context, the prominence, respect, and influence an individual is able to garner will be determined according to one's gender, which is a salient and visible characteristic in the workplace (Eagly et al., 2002; McDonald et al., 2013) . Following previous literature, the economic status will be defined as the earnings of the workers in an occupation (Kalmijn, 1994) .
I propose that male CEOs experience "status-consistency", whereas female directors experience "status-inconsistency" in terms of socioeconomic status. Male CEOs' economic status is determined by their occupation (Kalmijin, 1994) , and since CEO is widely known as one of the best-paying jobs (Forbes, 2017) , I claim that their economic status situates at the highest level in the economic status hierarchy. Moreover, male CEOs' social status is also at the highest level because men are claimed to be superior to females in power and status (Eagly et al., 2002 , Abraham, 2017 . Thus, since both of the economic and social status position at the highest hierarchy, they experience "status-consistency".
Considering that CEOs are the most desired board members (Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz, 2010) , I assume that female directors are CEOs from another firm. In line with this assumption, female directors' economic status is also at the highest level due to their main occupation, CEO. However, since females are perceived as inferior to men in power (Eagly et al., 2002; Abraham, 2017) , female directors' social status is relatively positioned lower compared to male CEOs due to their gender. Males are even termed as the breadwinner with higher status roles and females are claimed to be the homemaker with lower status roles (Eagly, Wood, and Diekman, 2000) . Also, the lower status of the females in the work force can be easily captured through the term "glass ceiling" and "invisible barrier" which is mainly applied to females, preventing them from reaching the higher level leadership positions (Oakley, 2000; Eagly et al., 2002; Elliott and Smith, 2004; Lee et al., 2007) . Furthermore, the unfavorable attitude towards females gets exacerbated when the females are endowed with power and control (Stets et al., 2000) , which describes the females in the boardroom. As such, female directors experience "status-inconsistency" due to the lower social status compared to the high position the males hold in the social hierarchy. In this regard, I suggest that the status-inconsistent female directors view the status-consistent male CEOs with disparity through the process of social comparison.
Social comparison theory
While individuals possess the need to be evaluated by others (Festinger, 1954) , we have seen that female directors and male CEOs are evaluated differently by the society.
The different evaluation has made female directors to be positioned comparatively at a lower hierarchy in their overall status compared to male CEOs. From the social comparison theory, individuals tend to compare themselves to someone regarded as similar or slightly better than oneself (Festinger, 1954; O'Reilly, et al., 1988) . Thus, in our study, female directors would regard male CEOs as those who are better positioned in the overall status. This line of thought by the female directors would compare themselves to the male CEOs.
In addition, social comparison theory has been propounded as an alternative legitimate explanation to the standard and traditional economic factors towards determining CEO compensation (O'Reilly et al., 1988; Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988) . O'Reilly et al. (1988) proposed that CEO compensation was strongly associated to the compensation level of the outside members in the boardroom through the process of social comparison, and the association was strengthened as the outside members were in the compensation committee. However, previous literature has not shed light on how status-inconsistency facilitates social comparison in terms of gender that influences executive compensation.
HYPOTHESES
Social identity theory provides a basis for understanding the CEO's pay determined by the board of directors' demographic attributes, such as gender (Abraham, 2017) . This identification and categorization with gender are processed automatically, independent of one's interests since gender is a salient characteristic in the workplace, and increases the tendency to associate with the same-gender (Abraham, 2017) . However, as seen from the "glass-ceiling", which females confront when going up the corporate ladder (Elliot et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2007) , females have been identified with the low social status in the workforce which is observed through the lower number of positions occupied by females that involve greater control (Elliot et al., 2004) . Thus, female directors, who are able to exert control over firm's decision-making, identify themselves in "female" category with lower social status compared to males.
While directors, regardless of gender, are normally portrayed to monitor CEOs (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton, 1998) , their supervision naturally leads directors and CEOs to position themselves to a comparison set (O'Reilly et al., 1988; Belliveau et al., 1996) . As such, since female directors and the society perceives their overall status to be lower than male CEOs, especially in terms of gender, female directors compare themselves to male CEOs, who are their monitoring target. Although female directors' economic status generated by their occupation is high as the male CEOs, the former's social status is inferior compared to the male CEOs in terms of gender.
Through the comparison made by female directors with male CEOs, I suggest that female directors aim to formulate a balance regarding their overall status toward male CEOs. The social status of "male" CEOs cannot be adjusted during the female directors' relatively short tenure since it has been embedded in our society for decades. As an alternative, I propose that female directors would target male CEOs' economic status in terms of their compensation. If a male CEO's compensation gets checked, his economic status would be suppressed compared to a situation where the boardroom consists of all males, who would sense balance with male CEOs in terms of socioeconomic status.
Therefore, in order to achieve balance in the overall status, the increase in the proportion of females in the boardroom would play a negative effect towards male CEO's compensation. However, since CEOs' compensation has been on the rise for decades (Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Davis and Mishel, 2014) , I aim to focus on the growth rate of the CEO compensation and investigate how that rate will be influenced by female directors.
Hypothesis 1: The proportion of female directors in the boardroom is negatively associated with the growth rate of male CEO's compensation.
While utilizing female directors' status-inconsistency and male CEOs' statusconsistency as a mechanism for facilitating social comparison theory, not only the compensation but also pay dispersion, which is measured through the highest paid four non-CEO members divided by that of the CEOs, would become a key monitoring object.
By increasing the level of pay dispersion, female directors will be able to "indirectly" target male CEO's economic status to be suppressed. Since CEO's earnings have been claimed to be disproportionately greater than those executives directly beneath him or her (Siegel and Hambrick, 2005) , I propose that increasing pay dispersion would indirectly weaken the economic status of the male CEOs. Thus, it will also lead to a balance in the overall status between female directors and male CEOs.
Hypothesis 2: The proportion of female directors in the boardroom is positively associated with the pay dispersion.
While the above hypotheses assume that female directors have a unitary social status, I now account for the variation in their social status. As directors acquire more board seats, it means greater status in the corporate elite and enhancement of their relative influence over the policy-making at all of the companies where they serve as outside directors (Finkelstein, 1992; Westphal and Khanna, 2003; Westphal and Stern, 2007; McDonald et al., 2013) . Therefore, I suggest that as female directors have more titles of another firm's board of directors, their influential power strengthens. Thus, female directors' tendency to target male CEOs' economic status will be stronger.
Hypothesis 3a: The negative association between the proportion of female directors in the boardroom and male CEO's compensation strengthens as the number of female director's appointments to other firm's board increases. Hypothesis 3b: The positive association between the proportion of the female directors in the boardroom and pay dispersion within a firm strengthens as the number of female director's appointments to other firm's board increases.
METHOD Sample and data collection
The sample frame for this study included all directors listed in Institutional The male-dominated industries possess a low number of females in the senior management positions, which implies females confront "glass-ceiling" frequently. Thus, I suggest that in male-dominated industries, where gender inequality is high, female directors' tendency to target male CEO's economic status strengthens because their social status compared to males would relatively be much lower than in gender-neutral industries. Additional robustness checks will be conducted toward female CEOs, and investigate the direction for main hypotheses. The balancing behavior was held by female directors because they perceive disparity toward the counterpart, male CEO. However, this disparity would not be activated by female directors toward female CEOs. Thus, I
assume to have no significance toward female CEOs.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is male executive's economic status. Since economic status is normally measured through one's earnings in an occupation (Kalmijn, 1994) , I intend to delve into categories of compensation. First, executive compensation is categorized into two. Contingent payment, which is designed to align the interest between shareholders and CEOs, depends on how well the executives or a firm performs.
It is usually observed through stock options, bonuses, and long-term incentive plans. On the other hand, non-contingent payment is measured by the level of salary and other annual cash compensation . In this study, since I depart our theoretical mechanism from agency theory, and rather focus on examining the female directors' influence toward male CEOs, I utilized salary which is one of the non-contingent payment.
In order to investigate how female directors' influential power impacted male CEO's salary, I assumed that it is more legitimate to look at the growth rate of the salary on a yearly basis. Due to the consistent rising trend of the executive pay for the past decades (Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Davis and Mishel, 2014) , a decrease in the amount of salary itself by female directors seemed improbable. Therefore, I suggest that the addition of female directors would influence the growth rate of male CEO's salary negatively.
In addition, another economic status of the executive which can be indirectly targeted by female directors is pay dispersion. To capture pay dispersion in a firm, I
followed Siegel and Hambrick (2005) by using the ratio of an average of the four highest paid non-executive's salary to the executive's salary. Thus, a larger ratio indicates greater pay dispersion which indirectly indicates relatively low salary of the executive, which demotes the executive's economic status indirectly. By increasing the pay dispersion, the non-executives will be portrayed to be gaining relatively more pecuniary benefits compared to the executive. Consequently, it will indirectly threaten the economic status of the executive.
Independent and Moderating Variable
In order to evaluate female directors' influence when determining the economic status of the male executive, the number of females in the boardroom is measured. I assume that the more of an individual is in a group, the more of that group's identity will be portrayed to the organization. Therefore, I suggest that as the number of females in the boardroom increases, the male executive's economic status will be threatened.
While H1 and H2 rely on the assumption that all female directors' influential power is equivalent, I intend to additionally consider the variance of it. I utilized a moderating variable that increases the variance of female directors' targeting behavior.
Following prior literature where more board seats held by directors is perceived as greater influential power as an outside director (Finkelstein, 1992; Useem, 1984; Westphal and Khanna, 2003; Westphal and Stern, 2007) , I utilized the average number of board appointments held by each female director at a focal firm in a given year. Thus, as the average number of board appointments held by each female director increases, their male CEO's growth rate of salary and pay dispersion will be more affected.
Control Variables
I included an extensive set of variables for individual-and firm-level characteristics that possess the possibility of influencing CEO's economic status. At the individual-director level, I controlled for whether a director is an outsider, the number of female director shares held, whether a female director is on the compensation committee.
Since outside directors in the boardroom normally monitor executives properly (Boivie, Graffin, and Pollock, 2012) , the compensation level for the executive will be determined without bias. The number of shares held normally portrays directors' financial interest in a firm (Boivie, et al., 2012) . Inclusion toward a compensation committee has a profound and direct effect on the executive's compensation (Belliveau et al., 1996; Daily et al., 1998; O'Reilly et al., 2010) . Thus, inclusion to the compensation committee is operationalized by aggregating the number of those female directors. At the individual-CEO level, I controlled for the CEO's age, tenure (Hill et al., 2015) , duality and also the average industry CEO's salary level. Prior literature has proposed that CEO duality has been claimed to impact the executive pay since it allows more influential power of the CEO in the boardroom that could bias the decision of CEO pay. CEO duality is operationalized using a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the firm's CEO was also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994; O'Reilly et al., 2010; Boivie et al., 2012) . The average industry CEO's salary was operationalized as the average value of the CEO salary for each industry in the dataset. At the organization level, board size is formulated by summing up the number of directors. Firm size was measured by using the logarithm of a firm's asset, and revenue and liability were both measured through utilizing its logarithm term. In addition, long-term debt is also utilized in the logarithm term as well.
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
First, I standardized all of the variables to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one in order to formulate a coherent result due to different units held by each variable. While the assumption of utilizing random-effects models is that the variance of an estimator is uncorrelated with the independent variables (Boivie et al., 2012) , it seems not applicable to the current study. Since prior literature has examined the consistent increase in CEO salary over time (Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Davis and Mishel, 2014) as well as generally increasing pattern in the number of females (Catalyst, 2017) , the fixedeffects model seems to be suitable for this study. Moreover, a common approach for analyzing data in a panel research design is to use fixed-effects model in order to capture differences within variables over time variation (Abraham, 2017) . Thus, through performing a Hausman test, which verifies the legitimacy of using fixed-effects model, the null hypothesis was rejected (p<0.001). It examined that the coefficients are systematic, verifying the need to use the fixed-effects model. Further, since the dataset includes identical information on directors and CEOs over time due to their continuation in their service, investigation toward autocorrelation in variables is imperative.
Additionally, the possibility of previous year's female influential power being enacted the year after and correlation within a single variable as a function of time lag is resolved through investigating autocorrelation issues by the Wooldridge test. It rejected the null hypothesis, which made the study to take autocorrelation issue into account. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables used in the study. According to the dataset, the average number of females in boardrooms is one when the average board size is nine. On average, the growth rate of salary was around ten percent and the average salary of the four highest paid non-executives is about half of that of the executive. Table 2 
RESULTS
Robustness Checks
I conducted a number of robustness checks to overcome the limits of these findings. I considered the possibility that female's targeting behavior will be contingent upon the type of industry. I posit that female directors' behavior will differ according to whether she is in a male-dominated industry or in a female-dominated industry. According to each type of industry, females would possess a different level of gender inequality. In maledominated industries, where the number of females at senior management position is low, female directors will perceive their social status to be relatively lower than in a femaledominated industry because of the severe gender discrimination. Due to the frequent gender discrimination experiences underwent by female directors in male-dominated industries, females would have a stronger tendency to suppress male CEO's economic status. On the other hand, in a female-dominated industry where females have a higher probability to reach the top of the corporate ladder, female directors experience less discriminative action or behavior. In this sense, I suggested that female directors in a female-dominated industry would possess weaker targeting behavior toward male CEO's economic status. Therefore, I intend to compare the influence of female directors' targeting behavior in male and female-dominated industries distinctively. semiconductors are chosen to be the male-dominated industries. On the other hand, industry that deals consumer services such as hotels and restaurants, media, food and beverage, retailing, consumer durables and services, and apparel are categorized into the female-dominated industry in this study. By comparing Model 1 and Model 5 in Table 3 , this study was able to capture female directors' balancing behavior toward male CEOs more explicitly in maledominated industries. In Model 1, female directors' influential power was only significant in male-dominated industries (β =-0.123, p<0.05), whereas there was no significance to the relevant variable. By delving into male-dominated industries specifically, the balancing behavior held by female directors were more severe compared to when looking at the whole industries and possessed significance. Thus, this study was able to confirm that female directors' balancing behavior is driven by gender inequality experienced in their environment which diminishes their social status. However, there was also no support for models that regard salary dispersion as its dependent variable. Overall, female directors do not possess an indirect balancing behavior toward male CEOs, and rather directly target those male CEOs. Table 4 where none of the coefficients for number of female directors were significant. To sum up, the additional robustness checks suggest that female directors' influential power toward targeting male CEO's economic status emerges (1) when female directors experience gender inequality in their embedded organization, and (2) when female directors perceive disparity toward their CEOs in terms of socioeconomic status.
DISCUSSION
While managerial discretion has been recognized as a pivotal source for one's performance and rewards, it has also been recognized as an important source of gender inequality in earnings (Briscoe and Joshi, 2017) . Previous research has focused on comparing earnings between each gender, concluding with the female's lower earnings compared to male's.
However, this study intended to focus on how managerial discretion in terms of one's gender is recognized toward the earnings for the other gender. Contrary to prior studies, I intended to figure out the influential power of females in the workplace as the number of them increases, especially toward the earnings of males. Since there exists a high uncertainty to how performance is rewarded (Briscoe and Joshi, 2017) , managerial discretion formed based on one's gender offers an important yet little-examined tool. Using panel data from S&P 1500 firms, I found that female directors' discretion emerges when setting male CEO's economic status through a balancing behavior. Further, the balancing behavior gets strengthened as female directors' social status increases, which is captured by the increase in one's number of other board appointments. Surprisingly, this balancing behavior is salient only in maledominated industries whereas no significance holds for the female-dominated industries.
Additionally, when examining female directors' influential power toward female CEOs, no significance was found. This implies that female's balancing behavior is activated when the level of gender inequality heightens, which negatively influences economic status of male CEOs. Overall, these findings suggest that gender inequality embedded in one's organization hampers legitimate decision-making processes and it is generally held when the actor perceives disparity toward the evaluated object.
The theoretical and practical implications of these findings extend beyond academia to the broader domain of research on gender inequality in a versatile organization context. First, this research contributes to the determinants of executive compensation, by providing an unconventional theory in social-psychology. The study suggests that actors, such as minorities, who perceive disparity toward their counterparts, possess balancing behavior toward the other.
In addition, while studies of identity in gender normally utilize a single and broad "status", this study managed to segregate status into two: social and economic status. While deviating from prior literature, this study suggests that balancing behavior would be dealt upon social and economic status. To compensate for the lower social status held by female directors, they endeavor to manipulate male CEO's economic status in a gender inequality context.
Additionally, although the study could not directly measure whether female directors' action is based upon their perception of gender inequality, I was able to indirectly capture this through conducting research in male-dominated industry and female-dominated industry separately. In general, I have examined that gender inequality which originated from outside the realm of corporate world seeps into female directors' managerial decision-making. I was able to conclude that managerial decision-making is not solely based on rational decision-making process. Actors' subjectivity gets in the way of forming legitimate managerial decisions.
Following Briscoe and Joshi (2017) , managers rely on their values and beliefs that shape the perception toward the counterparts in the corporate world. I theorized that, through the mechanism of balance formation behavior, minorities rely on their personal experience and personal identification when they make decisions.
These findings in my study have practical implication in enhancement of gender inequality at not only the workplace but at general organization as well. Since I was able to extrapolate that gender inequality prevents legitimate decision-making, and conclude that it lets actors' subjectivity in, enhancing gender equality in one's embedded organization seems to increase legitimacy in the process of making decisions. Thus, forming gender equality at the workplace is not only beneficial to females but also favors males in that the latter would benefit from the legitimized process for setting their level of earnings. In general, this study implies that discrimination from the social setting, which affects an individual or a group's behavioral decision-making, could cause total inefficiency of the organization.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Like every other research, this study is not exempt from limitations. First, the usage of secondary data on examining the issues of balancing behavior held by females carries inherent limitations. I was not able to assess the actual cognitive process that is possessed by female directors when setting male CEO's compensation. Rather, I relied on an archival data which does not ensure female directors' mental models. This limitation can be complemented further by employing more interviews with female directors in the corporate world. Second, the measure of pay dispersion is limited in the sense that I could not take gender into account for the four highest-paid non-executives. H2 and H3b could have had different results if I had taken the gender of non-executives into account. If the four non-executives were all females, although it is a rare case, it actually could have resulted in positive coefficients for the number of females in H2 and H3b.
Further research could be conducted toward the racial minorities. With all the same theoretical mechanism, there could be further research on how would the growth rate of White CEO's salary change as the racial minorities in the boardroom increases. It should result in the same as my study, concluding that the White CEO's salary growth rate will decrease as racial minorities increases in the boardroom due to the latter's balance formation behavior. Moreover, this study could be conducted in another country where gender equality is formed higher than the US, which is the current study's context. In a country with high gender equality, female directors would sense less disparity toward male CEOs. Thus, it will end up with female directors to possess lower tendency to form a balance with male CEOs through targeting the latter's economic status in a high gender equality country.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the findings show that increasing number of females in the boardroom exerts a negative influence toward male CEO's economic status. Female directors possess balancing behavior toward male CEOs due to the disparity in terms of socioeconomic status. Female directors experience status-inconsistency in their socioeconomic status that allows social comparison and balance formation behavior toward the status-consistent male CEOs. Thus, female directors target male CEO's economic status to make the overall status to be equivalent.
In addition, as female directors possess more influential power by having more board appointments at other firms, which increases their social status in the corporate elite, the targeting behavior aggravates. This behavior was only significant at male-dominated industries where gender inequality is high, which implies that gender inequality lets female directors' subjectivity to intervene where they perceive heightened degree of gender inequality.
Additionally, the balance formation behavior held by female directors was not exerted to female CEOs; it was only salient to male CEOs. 
